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The effects of public school teacher tenure remain hotly debated, but little understood. Research provides little evidence on the effects of tenure policy choices on teaching quality and, thus, little guidance on how to structure tenure policies. In this paper we examine the effects of a substantial tenure reform in New York City initiated in 2009-10. Below we summarize the key findings from this research, followed by a more detailed discussion of the New York City tenure reforms, our approach to the research, and the findings. 
Performance Screens for School

Highlights
• Tenure reforms in NYC led to a substantial drop in the percent of eligible teachers approved for tenure -from 94 percent during academic years 2007-08 and 2008-09, the two years prior to the introduction of the policy, to 89 percent in the first year of the policy and to an average of 56 percent during the three subsequent years.
• The vast majority of eligible teachers who were not approved for tenure had their probationary period extended. The proportion of teachers denied tenure changed only slightly, from two to three percent, following reform.
• Being extended meaningfully increased the likelihood a teacher would transfer across schools or exit teaching in New York City. The probability of transferring was nine percentage points higher and the probability of exiting was four percentage points higher for teachers who were extended compared with teachers in the same school receiving the same principal ratings who were approved for tenure. These differences represent a 50 percent and a 66 percent increase in the probability of transferring and exiting, respectively.
• Extended teachers who transferred or exited were less effective, as measured by principal ratings and value-added, than those likely to replace them. There were 45 percentage points fewer teachers rated as highly effective or effective among all extended leavers than their proxy replacements. In addition, estimated value-added in ELA among extended leavers was 20 percent of a standard deviation lower than among the proxy replacements.
Introduction
This paper describes teacher tenure reforms first enacted by the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) during the 2009-10 academic year (AY) and the changes in the district's teacher workforce following the reforms. We show that the reforms dramatically changed the proportion of eligible teachers receiving tenure, as well as the career paths of early career teachers, more generally.
Teacher tenure has been controversial since the first tenure provisions were enacted over a century ago. Proponents typically argue that tenure prevents teacher dismissal for political purposes or due to capricious decisions by administrators or politicians. Tenure could guard against dismissal of more experienced, higher paid teachers during periods of tight budgets when school leaders may be more focused on reducing costs while meeting class size requirements than they are on student learning. Tenure does not require schools or districts to retain ineffective teachers but instead provides a due process mechanism to dismiss tenured teachers for cause. Critics, however, argue that the cost of due process does, in practice, lead districts to retain ineffective teachers and as a result tenure not only allows poor teachers to stay in the classroom but also reduces the incentive for teachers to be as effective as they could be. They argue that the due process mechanisms for removing teachers with tenure are so burdensome that they rarely are pursued.
With the availability of large-scale student performance measures linked over time has come clear evidence that teachers vary substantially in their effectiveness at improving student test performance and that these differences can have meaningful effects on students in both the short run and the long run (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2012; Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004 continuing contract or service, permanent status, career status, and post-probationary status.
Regardless of the terminology, these laws have three main components: tenure requirements, reasons for dismissal, and process for appeals. The first specifies the length of the probationary period after which teachers are eligible for tenure. Employers can dismiss a non-tenured teacher at any time for any reason so long as the decision is neither arbitrary or capricious nor discriminatory, but tenured teachers can only be dismissed for the reasons provided in the law. The third component details the appeals process a dismissed tenure teacher can pursue in an effort to be reinstated. Of the 48 states in which public elementary and secondary teachers are awarded tenure, the minimum probationary period exceeds three years in 11 states (National Council on
Teacher Quality, 2012). In most states it is three years, although in a few states, such as California, teachers typically receive tenure with fewer than three years of experience. 
The Teacher Tenure Process in New York City
The criterion for tenure in New York City is that a teacher possesses "significant professional skill and a meaningful, positive impact on student learning." This criterion is not new. As in previous years, principals sent recommendations to the superintendent about whether a teacher should be denied tenure, have their probationary period extended or be granted tenure, but starting in 2009-10 principals had to provide a rationale for this decision if the evidence available at the district level suggested either a strong case to approve or deny tenure and this information ran counter to the principal's recommendation. The district provided principals with tenure guidance for teachers for whom there was evidence that performance was particularly strong or weak. For a teacher whose value-added results had been in the lowest 50 percent over the past two years (with a 95 percent confidence interval), who had previously received an Unsatisfactory annual rating, or whose tenure decision had previously been extended, the principal received guidance from the district that the teacher should be considered to have "tenure in doubt". A principal recommendation to extend or approve tenure for these teachers required a supporting rationale for the superintendent to consider in his or her review. The principal received guidance of "tenure likely" for a teacher whose value-added results had been in the highest 50 percent over the past two years (with a 95 percent confidence interval). Principals recommending denying tenure or extending the probationary period for these teachers similarly needed to provide supporting evidence to the superintendent (NYCDOE, 2009).
The process introduced in 2009-10 remained in place in 2010-11 with some notable changes (NYCDOE, 2010) . New in 2010-11, principals were asked to evaluate all teachers up for a tenure decision based a four-point effectiveness rating scale (Highly Effective, Effective, Developing and Ineffective) as described in the district-developed Effectiveness Framework.1 As in the prior year, the evidence for these ratings came from measures of the teacher's impact on student learning such as value-added measures from the Teacher Data Reports, student work products and tests aligned to the New York State standards. Principals also could use evidence from measures of instructional practice coming from their own classroom observations, teacher work products, and the annual rating sheet that principals complete for each teacher.2 In addition to these sources of information, which were available in the prior year as well, principals in 2010-11 gained information about professional contributions from surveys of students and parents, from measures of attendance, from colleague feedback, and from work products related to the Comprehensive Educational Plan for each school. In contrast to 2009-10, principals in 2010-11 no longer received "tenure likely" or "tenure in doubt" guidance from the district but rather were given flags indicating a "low value add" teacher as an "Area of Concern" and a "high value add" teacher as a "Notable Performance". Low and high value-added scores were defined as in the previous year. Other problematic teacher behaviors flagged as Areas of Concern included: low attendance (defined as 1 These effectiveness ratings are distinct from the ratings built into the new statewide teacher evaluation system which was not implemented until 3 years later in 2013-14. Although they use the same ratings scale, both the evidence synthesized and the relative weight assigned to the evidence differs between the two.
exceeding 20 days in the previous two fiscal years), an Unsatisfactory or Doubtful rating on a prior Annual Review Sheet, having been previously extended, having been previously excessed or currently in the Absent Teacher Reserve pool.
The tenure review process for 2011-12 was very similar to that in 2010-11, but with two important changes. As before, teachers were evaluated on impact on student learning, instructional practice and professional contributions. Principals were provided guidance as to the expected (though not required) alignment between the effectiveness ratings they determined using the Effectiveness Framework and their tenure recommendations: Highly Effective and Effective ratings were evidence in favor of granting tenure; a Developing rating, evidence for an extension;
and an Ineffective rating, evidence for denying tenure. Additionally, responsibility for producing teacher value-added estimates shifted from the district to the New York State Education Department beginning with 2010-11 and no measures were available for principals to incorporate them into their 2011-12 tenure decisions (NYCDOE, 2011).
The state-provided value-added estimates did inform principals' 2012-13
recommendations. Teachers received a growth score (0-20) that corresponded to a HEDI rating (Highly Effective, Effective, Developing, and Ineffective). No explicit guidance was provided to principals as to how to incorporate these growth ratings into their tenure recommendations. They were only told these ratings are a source of evidence for a teacher's impact on student learning.
Research Questions
Conceptually, the changes in the tenure process could well affect tenure outcomes. As new information on teacher performance becomes available to principals and pressures to be selective in granting tenure increase, the proportion of teachers receiving tenure could decrease. These changes could then lead to changes in teachers' choices. Teachers whose likelihood of receiving tenure diminishes may be more likely to leave teaching in the district even if they are not dismissed. Alternatively, some teachers may put more focus on improving the measures of their performance to improve their probability of receiving tenure. Because school principals play a central role in the process and because the teacher workforce differs across schools, we might expect the changes to differ across schools. In keeping with these potential effects, we address the following three research question in this paper: 
Results
Tenure Decisions
As described in Figure Principals have played an important role in the determination of tenure decisions. As shown in Table 2 , principal effectiveness ratings using the Effectiveness Framework of teachers are highly predictive of tenure outcomes under the new policy. Ninety-four percent of teachers rated Highly
Effective and 83 percent of those rated Effective were approved for tenure. In contrast, less than two percent of those rated Developing and less than one percent of those rated Ineffective were approved. The vast majority (97 percent) of teachers rated Developing were extended, while the vast majority (81 percent) of those rated Ineffective were denied tenure. Given that almost all teachers were approved for tenure prior to the reform, many teachers who would have been approved prior to the reform received a different outcome under the new system.
Tenure decisions also correspond with other teacher performance measures as shown in Table 3 . For teachers in tested grades and subjects, value-added estimates track tenure decisions.3
Teachers denied tenure have math value-added estimates that are a full standard deviation in teacher effectiveness lower than those approved for tenure. On average, extended teachers are 13 percent of a standard deviation in student achievement less effective than the average teacher and 38 percent of a standard deviation less effective than those who are approved. Value-added differences in ELA are smaller but demonstrate the same pattern. Similarly, extended teachers are far more likely to have had prior Unsatisfactory or Doubtful annual performance ratings and to have had Low Attendance than are teachers approved for tenure.
Even though there are substantial differences across the three tenure outcomes in teacher characteristics such as mean value-added estimates and the percent of teachers receiving Unsatisfactory or Doubtful rating or with low attendance, there remains substantial overlap in performance measures among accepted, extended, and denied teachers. For example, as shown in Figure 2 , which graphs the distribution of value-added scores for extended and approved teachers, many higher value-added teachers are extended and many lower-value-added teachers approved. Overall, the reforms dramatically reduced the percentage of teachers who received tenure, but because most teachers who became eligible for tenure were extended and not dismissed it is unclear a priori whether the reform meaningfully altered the workforce.
Workforce Composition
Changes in the tenure process can affect the quality of teaching by denying tenure to less effective teachers. We found some evidence of this mechanism in Table 3 in that denied teachers had lower value-added in both math and ELA than teachers who were extended or approved.
However, even under the new policies, few teachers are dismissed. Larger changes in the workforce instead may come from changes in voluntary turnover, particularly of teachers who are extended or who receive indications that they are likely to be extended.
Extended teachers may voluntarily exit from New York City, creating vacancies which can be filled by more effective teachers. We find some evidence of this phenomenon. As shown in Figure   3 , extended teachers were more likely to transfer to other New York City schools and exit from New York City in the year following their decision than teachers who were approved for tenure.
Ninety percent of approved teachers return to their schools, while only 75 percent of extended teachers did so.
Being extended meaningfully increases the likelihood of transfers and exits even after controlling for teacher and school characteristics. Table 4 gives the results of regressions with controls for the final principal effectiveness rating of the teachers as well as school fixed effects.
The probability of transferring increases by 9 percentage points if the teacher had been extended rather than approved. This represents a 50 percent increase in the probability of transferring following a tenure decision. Similarly, extended teachers exit NYC at a rate that is 4 percentage points higher than approved teachers, holding other factors constant. This represents a 66 percent increase in the probability of exiting. These results provide evidence that the new tenure process is having a substantial effect on the composition of the teaching workforce even without substantially increasing the percentage of teachers directly denied tenure.
Among extended teachers, those who remain in the same school have somewhat different measured attributes than those who transfer or exit the system. As shown in Table 5 , teachers with higher academic qualifications, such as teacher certification exam scores, are less likely to stay in the same school than to exit. Extended teachers entering through alternative routes such as the New York City Teaching Fellows program or Teach for America are less likely to remain in the same school than teachers entering through college recommended programs. In contrast, the average value-added estimates of extended teachers who remain in the same school are higher than those who do not, but the sample sizes are smaller for these measures and the differences are not statistically significant at traditional levels. replacements, and then average these within school differences across all such schools. In this way we examine the difference in teacher effectiveness between extended leavers and proxy replacements in the typical school.
As shown in Table 6 , there are substantial differences in the effectiveness of extended leavers and their proxy replacements. For example, there are 45 percentage points fewer teachers rated as highly effective or effective among all extended leavers than their proxy replacements (14 percentage points Highly Effective and 31 percentage points Effective). Estimated value-added in ELA is 20 percent of a standard deviation higher among the proxy replacements than the extended leavers.6 Although proxy replacement teachers are estimated to outperform extended leavers in math value-added, this difference is not statistically significant at traditional significance levels, due primarily to relatively few observations (N=158).
From a principal's perspective, these are large effects relative to almost any other intervention they might contemplate. For example, many principals rightly privilege experience when hiring teachers as the value-added of a teacher with six years of experience is estimated to be up to 15 percent of a standard deviation higher than a novice teacher (Atteberry, Loeb and Wyckoff, 2013) . Extending the probationary period of teachers with insufficient skills to be approved for tenure and thereby nudging some teachers to leave the school who are then replaced with a new teacher has an effect on teacher effectiveness about the same as the gains of hiring a teacher with six years of experience rather than a novice.
School Differences
While implementation of the policy may have varied across schools, most schools experienced a substantial change in the percentage of teachers who were approved for tenure under the new policy. More than 70 percent of schools granted tenure to fewer than 80 percent of their teachers following the introduction of the policy as shown in Figure 4 . While a cluster of schools approved 100 percent of eligible teachers, most schools approved far less, with another large cluster of schools with between 50 and 70 percent approval.
The variation in approval rates seen in Figure 4 corresponds to some school characteristics, particularly average student attributes, as shown in Table 7 . On average, teachers approved for tenure work in schools in which the percentage of white students is nearly twice as large as the schools where teachers were denied tenure. Black students experience the reverse. In schools where teachers are approved for tenure, black students comprise 27 percent of all students, but they comprise 40 percent of students in schools where teachers are denied tenure. The achievement of students in schools where teachers receive tenure is nearly a quarter of a standard deviation better in math and 18 percent of a standard deviation better in ELA than the average achievement in schools where teachers are denied tenure.
Given the strong link between principal effectiveness ratings and tenure decisions shown above, it is not surprising that the pattern of differences in school attributes across principal effectiveness ratings mirror the differences across tenure outcomes as shown in Table 7 . For example, the average highly effective teacher works in schools where the percentage of white students is twice as large as it is for the average ineffective teacher. The average ineffective teacher is located in a school with 65 percent more black students than their average highly effective colleague. As is also shown in Table 7 , the average ineffective teacher is located in a school where the ELA performance of students is more than a quarter of standard deviation lower and more than 30 percent of a standard deviation lower in math than that of the average highly effective teacher.
This suggests that replacing ineffective and developing teachers with a teacher whose performance is closer to the average would disproportionately improve the quality of teaching in schools with higher percentages of black students. Table 8 describes the relationship between school characteristics and tenure decisions in a multivariate framework controlling for teacher performance measures. When we estimate the model including only the attributes of the students in the school, the percentage of students who are black is the only measure that corresponds to the likelihood of being extended. When teacher attributes are added to the model, they dominate the determination of whether a teacher is extended. The estimate for the percent of black students drops substantially in magnitude such that a 1 standard deviation increase in the percentage of black students (26.4 percentage points) is estimated to increase the likelihood of a teacher being extended by just over 1 percent.
Discussion
Teacher tenure has been a hotly debated issue for decades, but there is surprisingly little research that documents the effects of various tenure policies. This paper examines an unusual change in the tenure policy in New York City as a step toward providing evidence to support the design of teacher workforce policies.
Our analysis documents substantial changes in tenure decisions following the NYC reforms.
While almost all eligible teachers received tenure prior to the change, after the reforms a large share of teachers did not receive tenure when they were first eligible, and instead had their probationary periods extended to provide more opportunity for them to demonstrate the skills necessary for effective teaching and for district decision makers to better assess teachers'
performance. Not surprisingly, low-performing and less qualified teachers were more likely to be extended. Teachers in schools with disproportionate shares of black and low-performing students also were more likely to be extended. Our analyses provide some evidence that this differential reflects a uneven distribution of less effective teachers, which is consistent with recent research (Isenberg et al., 2013; Sass et al., 2012) , although we cannot rule out differential application of tenure rules. Finally, we found evidence that the tenure policy resulted in additional voluntary attrition of teachers who were extended, as well as additional involuntary dismissal of the small share of teachers who were denied tenure. Among extended teachers, those with lower effectiveness, as measured by principals' ratings, but higher qualifications (e.g. SAT scores) were more likely to leave, potentially further benefiting the teacher workforce. Extended teachers who leave their schools are less effective as measured by principal ratings and value-added estimates than are those likely to replace them. Because teachers with poor effectiveness ratings are more likely to be in schools with higher percentages of black students, these schools are most affected by the policy change and most likely to see attrition of these less effective teachers as a result of the reforms. These schools on average were able to hire more effective teachers to fill these vacancies.
New York City's reforms to the tenure process are still in their early stages. Our results suggest large effects but provide only preliminary evidence because we have not fully ruled out the effects of other factors that may have been at play in the district simultaneously. With additional data a causal analysis will be more feasible and we can address additional questions. While the direct effects of the tenure reforms are felt by teachers facing tenure decisions, the labeling of teachers and increased likelihood of receiving an extension may induce other teachers in the same school, subject, and/or grade to reassess their positions. These processes may encourage principals to reassign teachers across grades and subjects or to reallocate responsibilities in other ways.
Changes in human resource practices including new hiring and evaluation policies have been hallmarks of many recent reforms. While the tenure process has been the subject of continual debate, reforms have been slower and less sustained in this area. In part as a result, research on tenure policies and variety of possible approaches to probationary periods and screening is sparse. Nearly all districts grant some form of tenure based at least in theory on teachers demonstrating proficiency. Yet many districts do only cursory evaluation during the tenure process. As such, adopting tenure reform similar to that presented here may be comparatively easy relative to other much discussed human resource policies that require more controversial policy changes. Extended teachers work in schools with different student attributes than approved teachers (p-value less than 0.01 for all attributes except the percentage of Hispanic students). Teachers denied tenure work in schools with different attributes than teachers who are extended with respect to the percentage of students who are black, the percentage whose home language is not English and mean student math scores (p-value less than 0.05). Differences in other student attributes are not significantly different from zero. b Teachers rated ineffective work in schools with different student attributes than teachers rated effective or highly effective (p-value less than 0.01 for all attributes except the percentage of Hispanic students and the percentage eligible for reduced-price lunch). Teachers rated developing work in schools with different student attributes than teachers rated effective or highly effective (p-value less than 0.01 for all attributes except the percentage of Hispanic students). 
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